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Introduction
Economic theo ry o riginated essentially under the impact of economic
development, and more sp ecifically just as the major Wester n nations
witnessed the rise of an endogenous, self-sustaining mechanism of cumulative
economic growth. This mechanism hinges on entrepreneurial initiative which,
chiefly through innovative decisions, harnesses the resources of technology, in
the broadest sense, to the service of the economy, making them one main basis
of profitability  and  competition. Never theless,  the  basic  fe atu res  of
entrepreneurship and innovation, and their linkages to the rise of uncertainty
have not received adequate treatment by economists, especially by macro-
economists. The studies on endogenous growth that followed Kaldor’s (1960)
function of technical progress, Arrow’s (1962) idea of learning by doing and
Shell’s (1967) sp ecification on the inventive secto r devoted to produce
knowledge represent the most advanced answer to some of these weaknesses.
Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992) have
enriched Shell’s intuition by linking the appearance of new inter mediate
products and quality based innovation to the development of knowledge.
All the above models (and those centred on the quality of human capital, as
in Lucas, 1988) explain endogenous g rowth through the addition of some
particular factors in the production function. Hence, they consider production
simply as the transformation of given inputs into output, ignoring that modern
dynamic economies are characteriz ed markedly  by re p e ated  shifts 
of
production functions due to innovation, as well as by uncertainty and the
entrepreneurs’ discovery role.
Kaldor’s (1960) openness to Schumpeter’s (1954; 1977) teaching and the
references to Schumpeterian creative destr uction by some followers of the
mainstre am economics are remote to fill this gap.  As a matter of fact,
Schumpeter, while he insists on the role of innovative entrepreneur, practically
fo rgets  the associated phenomenon of uncertainty.  This  prevents  him
enucle ating some major fe atu res of entre preneu rship and re 
presenting
satisfactorily the evolutionary mechanism of modern economy, in particular,
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the basic interaction between innovation and uncertainty, and specifying some 
supply functions not merely derived by the production function.
A useful tool to remedy the above drawbacks is von Mises’ (1976) and 
Hayek’s (1989) teaching on the incompleteness of knowledge, the role of 
unintentional events and uncertainty, the discovery process by trial and error 
through markets, the co-ordination function of these and the meaning of 
entrepreneurship that emerges in this context, as systematized for the economy 
by Kirzner (1973; 1989).
A central aspect of this essay is in fact a notion of dynamic competition 
resulting   from   the   interaction   betwe en   innovative   and   adaptive 
entrepreneurship, i.e. the combination of the Schumpeterian notion of creative
destr uction and Kirzner’s treatment of entrepreneurial alertness, market 
process and co-ordination. This imposes a redefinition of the theory of the 
decisions to produce that rejects the traditional theory of firm in favour of an 
alternative approach consistent with the notion of dynamic competition, that 
permits to point out some explanatory factors of output different from the 
availability of inputs, often ignored.
Another key point of this analysis is the role it ascribes to the variance of 
profit rates across firms, considered as a proxy of the degree of uncertainty 
and disequilibria characterizing the economy, that allows some clarification on 
the  theory of accumulation and to fuse adaptive and innovative 
entrepreneurship in a unitarian process. This leads to an explanation of 
business cycle and an extension of the theory to social development and 
cycle, evidentiating an unambiguous direction of the evolutionary process.
To better express the mechanism of evolution that this interpretation sets 
out, a concise application to successive phases of economic development is also
performed by introducing, in the basic model, some alternative assumptions, 
mainly on entrepreneurship, technological progress and, more broadly, the 
performance of dynamic competition, on income distribution and the forms of 
markets organization. This provides a comprehensive interpretative tool and 
pictures of different growth processes and the crucial factors on which they 
depend.
The model hypothesizes a closed economy, excludes money and does not 
consider the public sector, but these shortcomings might easily be remedied.
The model
A dynamic economy, i.e. characterized by incessant and unpredictable changes
of technology, consumers’ preferences and the availability of natural resources,
hence by innovation and uncertainty, is hardly representable by traditional
economics. A more suitable theoretical framework must be centred on the
specification of the basic mechanism propelling such a dynamism. This cannot
be fed and driven efficiently by a centralized bureaucracy. So, the explanation 
of
economic growth and development must give a central role to the entrepreneur
and a re alistic inter pretation  of markets.  Besides, it must  endogeniz 
e
innovation, uncertainty and adaptation, representing the main features of the
evolutionary process of the economy and society. The fulfilment of these
 
requirements can take advantage from the specification of an appropriate 
notion of dynamic competition. But a preliminary definition is indispensable 
for a better understanding of the analysis that will follow.
This essay expresses the dimensions of disequilibria (accompanying the
development process), and the existing set of opportunities for profit, through
the differences among the profit rates of firms, as measured by the variance of
profit rates across firms. It also considers that this measure offers an important
proxy of the degree of uncertainty of economic life, both because the residual
nature of profits fully expresses the ultimate impact of stochastic elements
affecting the economic process, and because the differences among the profit
rates of firms gives a faithful picture of the incompleteness of knowledge; in
fact, a zero difference (variance) of profit rates across firms would require a
perfect knowledge, with omniscience of the entrepreneur.
Economic competition is driven by the search for profit that takes two forms:
first, the creation of new opportunities for profit through innovation, which can
be   called innovative   entre preneu rship   and   comp etition   o r, 
following
Schumpeter (1954), creative destr uction. (Schumpeter says: “This kind of
competition is as much more effective than the other (based on prices) as a
bombardment is in comparison with forcing a door”); second, the systematic
exploitation of existing opportunities for profit (synthetized by the variance of
profit rate) due to market  disequilibria, which can be called adaptive
entrepreneurship and competition – it is well expressed by the Kirzner’s notions
of market process and entrepreneurial alertness.
Innovative entre preneu rship  causes disequilibria, obsolescence,  the
amplification of the variance of profit rates, and uncertainty, while adaptive
entrepreneurship is the leading force of the adjustment processes towards new
equilibria, thus implying the reduction of disequilibria and uncer tainty.
Innovative entrepreneurship is embodied by innovative investment, while
adaptive entrepreneurship is expressed by the incessant revision of productive
choices stimulated by the variability of profit rates and expectations.
The notion of dynamic competition that this essay sets out results from the
combination of the two above forms of competition. There exist some 
important
interactions between them, that may be described as follows.
In the presence of high disequilibria and a large variance of profit rates
across firms and uncertainty, adaptive entrepreneurship (i.e. the revision of
productive choices directed to take profit of the existing disequilibria or, more
precisely, pushed by the variance of profit rate) prevails, at the expense of
innovative entre preneu rship.  This is also compressed by the fact that
investment, mainly innovative, involving long run expectations, sunk costs and
irreversibilities, is discouraged by high uncertainty that reduces the reliability
of information and increases its cost (furthermore innovations have to meet
initially various unexp ected drawbacks, that imply lower retu r n, high
uncertainty and a large use of entrepreneurial skills). But the predominance of
adaptive entrepreneurship resulting in the reduction of disequilibria and the
variance of profit rate, sque e z es out profit opp o rtunities; so that such 
a
predominance erodes its own basis. To overcome the depressive impact of this
squeeze on profit rate, entrepreneurs will be encouraged to intensify 
innovation, which again amplifies the variance of profit rate, hence the set 
of  existing  opportunities for profit. Such a shift towards innovative 
competition is also stimulated by the fact that the decrease in uncertainty due 
to the equilibrating  nature of adaptive competition favours and encourages 
substitution of plants,  previously postponed, and hence innovation. But the 
diffusion of innovations  causes a rise in obsolescence, disequilibria, the 
variance of profit rate and  uncertainty, thus recreating the basis of adaptive 
competition, and the fall of the profits achieved by the pioneers; this opens the 
door to the recovery of adaptive  entrepreneurship, while innovative projects 
are put in the drawer, waiting for some clearer perspectives and a further 
recovery of innovative competition. In  sum, disequilibria and uncertainty 
intensify adaptation (i.e. the revision of  productive choices aimed at taking 
advantage of the existing opportunities for profit due to disequilibria), and 
depress innovation; this pushes the economy to  adjust towards equilibrium 
(thus squeezing adaptive opportunities for profit)  that, in  turn, stimulates 
innovation both to  recreate  profit opportunities and  owing to the 
improvement of long r un expectations due to the decrease in uncertainty; 
and so on, with a cyclical interaction of the above two forms of competition.
This innovation-adaptation process is at the heart of the mechanism of
economic growth and development and represents a specification, for the
economy, of the more general succession “innovation-structural organization”
giving the basic engine of social development.  Instead, it is almost irrelevant 
for
the explanation of the development process to investigate the extremely 
various
ways inventions take place, as these produce effects on the economy through
innovation. If a competitive mechanism stimulating innovative investment
operates, the knowledge and inventions required to feed it will certainly be
produced, in one way or the other. A subtle deepening of this matter is in Scott
(1992). A complete formalization of the process innovation-adaptation would
require a micro analysis. A first step of that formalization, useful for macro
analysis, may consist in the explanation of innovation and uncertainty-variance
of profit rate through a Lotka-Volterra predator-prey system (with uncertainty
acting as the predator and innovation as the prey) that describes the cyclical
interaction between these two variables:
DII = β1II – β2uII                                                                                                                (1) 
Du = –β3u + β4IIu + c1ξ                                                                                          (2) 
II = innovative investment
u = variance of profit rate across firms, which also is a proxy of uncertainty 
per unit of output
ξ = exogenous factor of uncertainty
D = differential operator d/dt.
Of course, the variance of profit rate can be explained only at micro level. 
Nevertheless, the simple explanation given by equation (2) seems to be helpful 
for macro-economic investigation.
The parameter β1 is a constant exponential rate of growth of innovation, 
expressing  the  autonomous  push  to  innovate  due  to  entre preneu rial 
aggressiveness; its impact on DI is reduced by the rise in the variance of profit 
rate across firms and uncertainty. β3 is an exponential rate of variation of the 
variance of profit rate and uncertainty; its negative sign expresses the 
compressing effect on u arising from adaptive competition.
The above formalization implies a prominence of equations (1) and (2) on the 
remaining relations of the model. These are influenced by the Volterra system 
but do not influence it. A more detailed representation of reality would remove 
such a prominence and establish a bidirectional linkage.
It may be assumed that the “reproduction” hypothesis, typical of Volterra’s 
study on populations, operates only in the equation of innovation in that each 
innovation is strongly influenced by the state of knowledge due to previous 
innovations. In the equation of the variance of profit rates, however, it may 
operate only backwards as uncertainty stimulates adaptation. This means that 
in (2) the cross-product term of Volterra, the encounter between predator and 
prey, will be replaced by the prey (innovation) only.
The parameter of the above differential system gives an important picture of 
dynamic competition and the economic development process characterizing 
various countries and different sectors of the same country (as well as an 
explanation of the difference in the rate of growth among countries).
Various studies have measured the degree of dynamic competition in the 
economy (Mueller, 1990; Odagiri, 1994) by the rapidity of reduction in the 
differential (hence variance) of profit rates. Such a procedure only considers the 
adaptive aspect of dynamic competition, so substantially it limits itself to the 
term β3 of equation (2). This is a poor draft of the forces of competition and
economic dynamism.  The  dynamic  comp etition process consists  in a
disequalibrating-equilibrating movement. To understand its meaning, intensity
and implications it is necessary to consider all the parameters of equations (1)
and (2), taking present that parameters β1 and β2 express respectively the
innovative  push  and  its  brake ,  and  p arameters  β3  and  β4  synthetiz e
respectively the adaptive push and its brake. Thus β1 and β4 represent the
disequilibrating forces while β3 and β2 synthetize the equilibrating forces.
To complete the formalization of the process of dynamic competition, we
need a theory of entrepreneurial decisions to produce consistent with such a
process, which permits specification of an explanatory function of output. The
two basic assumptions of the mainstream theory of firm, i.e. the hypothesis that
entrepreneurs know technology perfectly (the constraint of the optimum
problem in such a theory) and the notion of perfect competition based on prices,
are at all inconsistent with dynamic competition, hence unable to represent
reality. In the modern economies dominated by innovative competition and
uncertainty, technical coefficients are known only after the accomplishment of
the productive process. This study substitutes to the mainstream theory of the
firm based on the maximization of profit under the constraint of the available
technology and productive resources, a theory of the entrepreneurial choice
postulating the maximization of a function expressing the “attractiveness” of
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each productive choice, under the constraint of the available entrepreneurial 
skill. More precisely, the hypothesis is that the entrepreneur distributes his 
skills among the sectors lying in the area of his interests and choice, with the 
purpose of maximizing the total benefit which can be derived from productive 
skills. This approach is suggested, among other things, both by the elementary 
consideration (first pointed out by Schumpeter) that the only scarce resource 
for an entrepreneur is his skill as all other resources can easily be provided at 
the  market prices  by a successful  businessman, and by the fact  that the 
entrepreneur’s knowledge of his skill (the constraint of our maximum 
problem)  is much better than that of the variable technologies. Of course, 
entrepreneurial skills have a different content with reference to an individual 
or a managerial  firm; they are largely represented by the decisional routines 
typical of each firm.
The maximum problem for each entrepreneur may be formulated as follows:
Max Σi r°i f(Xi) 
Σi giuiXi ≤ E 
p  
r°i Xi ≥ Mi
i refers to each activity:
X  = level of output;
u  = degree of uncertainty;
g  = entrepreneurial skills required per unit of output, in the presence of a 
given degree of uncertainty (say u = 1);
E p = available entrepreneurial skill (entrepreneur engaged in some activities 
should not refer the first constraint to E p but reallocated entrepreneur- 
ial skill resulting from the difference between his total available skill 
and that absorbed by the level of profitable activities in which he 
operates);
M = minimum expected advantage required to operate in sector i.
r° is a measure of “attractiveness”, for each entrepreneur, of the various 
activities. It may be represented as a function of the actual observed profit rate 
(r), uncertainty (u) and the excess demand (Xd/X) influencing expectations and 
τ (the non-monetary benefits connected to the entrepreneurial role), i.e.:
r° = f(r, u, Xd/X, τ )
with ϑr°/ϑu<0. r is a sectoral profit rate and X (in the term Xd/X) refers to 
sectoral output, not to output of each entrepreneur that would imply circularity 
in the optimization problem. (More precisely, the function r° should put r , 
indicating the highest profit rate that entrepreneur knows, in the place of r . For
its part,  
,  
should be explained through an equation expressing the search for
profit, which is obviously promoted by the variance of profit rate. Of course, 
these developments would imply a micro sp ecification of the theory) 
The constraints of the maximization problem are either linear, with g and u 
being given for the entrepreneur, or convex, as the scale of production may at 
first fall and later increase the skills required per unit of output; while the 
objective function is concave owing to the increasing effect of output on
 
profitability due to economies of scale, and the decre asing one due to 
organizational limits and increasing risk. (Thus the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are 
necessary and sufficient for the existence of a global maximum.) The above 
problem expresses the entrepreneurs’ tireless revision of choices, directed to 
exploit the best existing market opportunities. The entrepreneur is obliged to 
search for the best profit opportunities by uncertainty, i.e. by the fear that 
otherwise he might  make losses in the competition with  maximizing 
entre preneu rs, and be fo rced out of business. Of cou rse , the theo 
retical  foundation of  the above optimization approach does not require 
that  entrepreneurs effectively solve maximization problems, but only that 
such an approach well represents the basic behaviour of entrepreneurs.The 
central  position it attributes to skills and uncertainty is consistent with 
bounded rationality in a world characterized by imperfect information so that 
learning processes and any associated non-linearities (Day and Chen, 1993), as 
well as with Nelson’s and Winter’s (1982) teaching on decisional routines 
which  represent an important expression of entrepreneurial skills. 
Moreover,the hypothesized entrepreneur’s behaviour is consistent with a large 
variety of firm  organization and decisional routines,  which  determine the 
degree of success  of e ach fir m. The maximum problem has a unique 
solution, implying the  functional relationship Xi = f(r°i, E
p, gi, ui, Mi). At 
the macro level g and M
disappear but not r° (the aggregate attractiveness on entrepreneurs to produce)
as its value influences output, both through entry and exit (hence Ep) and 
because of the inequality constraint on Ep and M. The substitution of r° with its 
explanatory variables (i.e. r, Xd/X, u, τ ) gives the following aggregate function 
for output:
X = f(r, u, E p, Xd/X, τ )
with ϑ(X)/ϑu<0.
Xd/X = excess demand;
r = actual observable profit rate.
If u = 0, implying a perfectly repetitive economy, no entrepreneurship is 
required, as such an economy can be directed efficiently by a bureaucratic 
management and by computers. Of course, the operator f in the above function 
is influenced largely by the lack of entrepreneurial knowledge; as a matter of 
fact, if a productive opportunity is unknown, it will be non-influential on the 
entrepreneur’s decision and output.
In the presence of market power, the above supply function is characterized 
by smooth variations of r, due to the relative invariance of the markup margin. 
But the parameter of Xd/X is, in the case of an oligopolistic market, higher than 
in a market regulated by demand and supply, since the defence of the price 
imputed ne eds that price makers promptly adjust supply to demand, by
varying the degree of capacity utilization.
Solving the expression of X for r, gives:
r* = f(X, u, Ep, Xd/X, τ ) (3)
with ϑr*/ϑEp < 0; ϑ r*/ϑ (Xd/X) < 0; ϑr*/ϑτ < 0.
r* is a desired or partial equilibrium profit rate, required to produce X unit of 
output for given values of u, Ep, Xd/X, τ .
An expression for the growth of income could be derived by optimization of 
an intertemporal objective function. In this paper, however, the equation of r* is 
used to provide an expression for the rate of growth of income:
DX/X = α (r – r*) 
(4) Equation (4) explains the variation of output through the adjustment of 
actual
profit rate towards the desired profit rate. If r > r*, i.e. the actual profit rate
exceeds the profit rate required to produce the current level of output, output 
grows, while it decreases if r < r*. If r = r*, the rate of growth is nil (stationary 
equilibrium) as the entrepreneur obtains just the profit rate required to produce 
the current level of output.
Parameter  α in (4) indicates the entre preneu rial alertness in taking 
advantage of the market opportunities; the lower the entrepreneurs’ degree of 
knowledge of such opportunities, the lower is α . It may be important to point 
out that the above equation of output embodies all factors influencing the 
decision to produce, precisely both the conditions of profitability expressed by 
r  (including the effect of income distribution, demand, technology, prices), 
and  those of entrepreneurship, expressed by the variables on which r* 
depends.  This prevents the one sidedness characterizing other theories of 
growth.
Equations (1), (2) and (4) give the representation of the whole process of
dynamic competition and the basic engine of growth.
The explanation of repetitive investment may be derived by substituting
capital to output in (4). But there is an important difference with respect to
production. We have previously seen that decisions to invest, involving long 
run
expectations, are much more influenced by uncertainty than those to produce,
owing to sunk costs, irreversibilities and rapid growth, with uncertainty, of the
costs of information necessary to support long run forecasting. This suggests
that the equation of the variation of capital should be of the following form:
DK/K = β(r – r*) – a1(u) (5)
K stands for the stock of capital, while a1u indicates the above additional 
impact of uncertainty on investment. Substituting equation (4)  into equation 
(5), gets:
DK/K = β/α(DX/X) – a1(u).                                                                                     (5') 
As we can see, in the presence of innovation and uncertainty, the variation of 
capital tends, on the one hand, to exce ed the variation of X owing to the 
innovative push, but on the other hand is slowed by uncertainty. This means 
that when uncertainty is low, the capital-output ratio tends to increase, while it 
tends to decrease in the opposite situation. The constancy of the capital-output 
in the long r un is probably the result of the cyclical interaction betwe 
en innovative and adaptive entrepreneurship and competition.
It is cr ucial for an explanation of economic g rowth and development 
to combine the analyses of  Schumpeter and Kirzner  on entrepreneurship 
and  competition. Their separate use is misleading. Schumpeter’s theory 
neglects the
importance of uncertainty and, more generally, of the adaptive process; but, if 
comp etition were only based on cre ative destr uction, it would cause an 
excessive destr uction, i.e. obsolescence.  Imitation (of innovators) does not 
promote, per se, the return to the circular flow; on the contrary, it increases the 
impact of innovation on the economy, hence obsolescence, disr uption and 
disequilibria, notwithstanding it favours the return to routine in the specific 
sector. Therefore, it explains the cycle of products, but is unable to explain that 
of the whole economy. For its part, the Kirzner’s analysis centred on market 
adjustment process as a result of the entrepreneurs’ alertness does not take care 
of explaining economic development, “seen merely as a special case” (Kirzner,
1973, p. 81). But the Kirznerian equilibrating process is incomplete without the
disequilibrating one, which is Schumpeterian, that creates the basis for market 
adjustment process.
A succinct exposition of the remaining equations of the model is given 
below. Labour demand is explained by the inverse of a production 
function, as
follows:
   1
L X  5 K
–      6     –
5 e
    7    I I
5
    8    Du
e  5 (6 )
L is employment and e indicates exponential.
The above production function includes, among other things: technical
progress, expressed by innovative investment (II); the variation of uncertainty, 
that influences the efficient combination of productive factors. The last two 
factors reflect the cyclical behaviour of innovation and uncertainty; their
opposite effect does not cancel out as the variation of u oscillates around a value 
tendentially constant of this variable, while is II > 0. Of course, equation (6) 
gives by implication labour productivity, output being explained by equation
(4). Note that here the production function does not explain output directly, as 
the models of endogenous growth do; it influences output indirectly, through 
the  presence of L in the profit identity below. Output depends on 
productive  decisions of the entrepreneur and the mechanism of dynamic 
competition.
The relevance that this model ascribes to the distinction between actual and 
p ar tial equilibrium profit rate makes it necessary to give an accu 
rate description also of the first. It may be expressed by the following identity:
r
X 
–
L w 
– i – tax (7 )
K K  p
Where w/p is the real wage, i is the real interest rate and tax stays for the 
coefficient of taxation on capital. r is the profit rate, taken in real terms. Note 
that the profit rate differs from the real interest rate which is simply considered 
an exogenous cost, but it could easily be made endogenous. The return on 
capital is r + i; it is equal to i only in the exceptional case that r = 0.
Price can be expressed by the adjustment of demand and supply, i.e.
Dp/p = µ(Xd – X) (8)
or, in the presence of market power, by:
P = (1 + pi )wϑ L/ϑ X (8')
where pi stands for the deg re e of monopoly and could be indicated as an 
increasing function of the variation rate of innovative investment (DII /DII); ϑ is 
a symbol of partial derivative.
Various hypotheses will be formulated on income distribution, in connection 
with some assumptions on the form of markets and the evolution of economy 
towards successive phases of development, discussed later.
Real consumption (C ) is expressed as:
C = cX (9)
c is an average propensity to consume.
Aggregate demand is specified through the identity:
Xd = C + DK + Z (10)
where Z is the exogenous factor of demand.
Finally, an explanatory equation for the availability of entrepreneurial skills 
is postulated:
E p = Xη with 0 < η < 1. 
(11) This equation supposes that, at the macro level, the availability of 
entre-
preneurial skills (E p) grows with aggregate output, as a result of the entry of 
new entre preneu rs as the market exp ands. 0 < η < 1 (i.e. Ep g rows at 
a  decreasing rate) owing to: first, the physical and organizational limits to 
the  skills of firms, mainly the reduction, with the concentration process, of 
adaptive skills (this limitation gives a main explanation of the limit to the size 
of firm);  and second, the entry of less skilful entrepreneurs when X grows, 
previously kept outside the market.
The interaction innovation-adaptation and evolution. Business 
cycle  versus social development cycle
In this model, growth is driven by dynamic competition that generates inno- 
vation and reduces, through adaptive action, the consequent disequilibria and 
uncertainty. Innovation stimulates growth owing to its impact on the actual 
profit rate (r) via the production function (i.e. labou r productivity) and 
investment hence demand, while adaptation stimulates g rowth through the 
reduction in uncertainty, hence in r* and the increase in labour productivity. 
The
core equations of the model are those for innovation (1), uncertainty (2), and 
output (4). Important roles are also played by the equation for the stock of 
capital (5) and the production function (6), as well as equation (11) for the 
availability of entrepreneurial skill, owing to the impact of this variable on r*, 
and hence on the rate of growth of income.
Equations (1) and (2) of innovation and uncertainty display a dominant role
in the model, as they influence the rest of the system without any feedback. This 
aspect of the model is unrealistic, but this can easily be remedied through the 
introduction in the two equations of some other explanatory variable.
 
The aggregate nature of the model impedes the role of sectoral disequilibria 
in generating actual profit rate (r) and the partial equilibrium profit rate (r*). In 
the absence of innovation and the resulting disequilibria and uncertainty, r and 
r*   disapp e ar and the stationary   state   dominates the scene. In re 
ality,  disequilibrium prevails (a disaggregated model would show this 
clearly) as a  consequence of the entrepreneurial innovative competition, 
with positive or  negative rates of growth according to the conditions of 
profitability (influencing  r) and those of entrepreneurship (influencing r*) 
making r > r* or vice versa (in an economy without entrepreneurs, growth 
could only be pushed by some  autonomous  decision to invest, car ried 
out by the p olitical sphere o r bureaucracy. But bureaucratic behaviour 
tends to avoid innovations that  undermine the established roles, thus 
preventing development). For its part,  accumulation fluctuates around the 
rate of growth of income, owing to the  higher impact that uncertainty 
plays on investment than on output. As a  consequence,  the output-capital 
ratio fluctuates around a tendentially constant value.
At the heart of economic dynamics there is the entrepreneurial action or, 
mo re precisely, the interaction betwe en innovative and adaptive entre- 
preneurship and competition that, as just seen, pushes endogenous growth. 
Such growth has a cyclical behaviour, due to the alternation, over time, of a 
phase of innovative push, characterized by the rise in innovation, and a phase 
of  structural organization, devoted to establishing some  new equilibria 
starting  from the previous innovations and distinguished by a squeeze of 
innovation  and the prevalence of adaptation. If these two phases (innovation 
and structural organization) were not reciprocally lagged or were separated by 
very short lags, the cycle would disappear or would be very smooth. But this is 
not the case. The innovative dash requires a well ordered system, i.e. coasting 
some equilibrium positions. As soon as this happens, innovation projects are 
introduced;  their  diffusion induces further innovations along with increasing 
disequilibria, that  stimulate the need for str uctural reorganization and 
adaptation. The cycle innovation-uncer tainty affects output both directly 
and owing to labou r productivity, investment and demand.
The interaction innovation-adaptation may explain cycles of different
periods simply by considering various kinds of innovations. When the large set
of innovative possibilities due to basic innovations has been exploited, along
intermediate cycles innovation-adaptation, new technological paradigms and
new basic innovations (even in institutions), implying long waves, will take
place, that will allow the continuation of the dynamic competition process.
These cycles of innovations are strengthened by the cyclical behaviour of
inventions underlined by Kuhn (alternation in the development of ordinary and
extraordinary knowledge).
The mechanism described here seems to provide also a useful tool for the
interpretation of social and historical development. This may be represented
through the alternation of a breaking phase, characterized by the prevalence of
fundamental discoveries, and an adjustment phase aimed at developing,
exploiting and systematizing the implications of the main discoveries. This
shows some similarities to the Kuhn theory of the str ucture of scientific 
revolutions. But Kuhn describes the evolution of sciences as due to the 
exhaustion of paradigm, marked by the appearance of “anomalies”. This is not 
convincing. In a stationary system, the paradigm perseveres immortally, 
anomalies do not appear. It is the propensity to innovate that gives the basic 
push to development, thus breaking up conventional knowledge and the 
strength of tradition. Such a propensity depends on the form of civilization 
(degree of openness to the novelties or the existence of some mechanism 
forcing innovation, as the search for profit based on innovative competition). 
It is not the wasting of paradigms that opens the road to innovation, rather the 
contrary happens.
The cycle discussed here expresses the simple evidence that innovative push 
is the true engine of the movement of societies (its absence would have left 
mankind in the stone age). But even adaptation plays a central role, as it 
provides the diffusion over the whole system of such a push and the 
consistency  among the various comp onents of the system. The 
interaction betwe en innovation and structural organization may be seen as 
a basic law of social  evolution, with a role similar to that played by the 
Darwinian succession  “accidental mutation-selection” for the natural world 
evolution. In the present  age, distinguished by the centrality of  the 
economic subsystem, the above engine of development is mainly activated 
by entrepreneurial competition. But some other subsystem and evolutionary 
mechanism may prevail in the future.
The discrete extraordinary events represented by innovations, with their 
impact on environment expressed by the continuous adaptive process, produce 
irrevocable changes. The direction of evolution, marked by the increasing 
variety of goods and knowledge, hence the increase in social complexity, gives 
the histo rical time. Such an evolutionary process does not app ear at the 
agg regate level, where only the g rowth in productivity due to technical 
progress is visible. Its representation needs disaggregation.
Econometric estimation
The lack of observations has prevented a simultaneous estimation of the
complete model. This has been divided in two submodels for estimation: one
concer ning Volter ra’s system fo r innovation and uncertainty; the 
other
represented by the equations of output (and desired profit rate), employment
and actual profit rate.
In the absence of data series on innovative investment, the estimate of
innovation uses the data on patent applications (giving a reliable expression of
the intention to innovate) published by the US Department of Commerce, while
the data on the interquartile variation of profit rates (instead of the variance of
profit rates) come from a sample of about  8,000 manufacturing firms, 
performed
for the period 1982-1992 by the Italian Centrale dei Bilanci. The estimation
results must be judged in the light of the deficiencies of appropriate data series
and the shortness of the observation interval.
A full information maximum likelihood estimator was used to preserve the
interactions among equations. The estimation of the differential system for
Estimate of parameters Asymptotic standard error t values
β1 0.164 0.274 0.66β2 0.150 0.291 0.52β3 0.688 0.649 1.06β4 0.324 0.290 1.11
innovation and the variance of profit rates (equations (1) and (2), with the term 
II in the right hand side of equation (2) instead of IIu, has given the following 
results shown in Tables I and II.
It is considered that the shortness of the sample (only 12 observations) and 
the use of interquartile variation of profit rates (instead of variance) are the 
reasons why the asymptotic standard errors are relatively high. However, the 
values of the parameters are reasonable and always have the correct sign and 
also the estimated standard deviations are reasonable.
Table  I. 
Estimation of the 
system (1), (2)
Observed Estimated
Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation
Table  II.
Mean and standard IIu 1.9102 0.1614 1.9100 0.1523
deviation u 0.8568 0.0535 0.8560 0.0564
Now we come to a simultaneous FIML estimation of the following model:
DlogVA = α 1(r – r
*)
with
r* = log γ + a0logVA – a2(logEp – λt + logKU)
DlogL = α2log L*
L
with
logL* = logA + β5logVA – (1 – β5)logK
r = V  A.P    –  wL   –   
iKP KP
logPROD = logVA – logL.
Where VA indicates real value added in industry; L stays for employment in 
industry and w for wage rate; r is the actual profit rate in industry; and r * the 
desired profit rate; PROD stays for industrial productivity of labour; P is the 
deflator of industrial value added; K is the stock of capital in industry and KP 
its expression in nominal terms; i is a nominal interest rate and KU the degree 
of utilization of plants. Log stays for natural logarithms.
The conditions of entrepreneurship in the equation for r* are represented by 
the term E p/eλ t giving the deviation of the number of firms from their trend. r* 
being unobservable, for estimation it needs to substitute its equation in the 
equation for DlogVA.
Estimates have used a sample of 56 quarterly observations on the Italian 
economy from 1980 to 1993, coming from ISTAT. The estimated  parameters 
are shown in Table III.
Enter equation Estimate of Asymptotic
Parameters number parameters standard error t values
α1 (1) 2.410 0.871 2.77
α2 (2) 0.090 0.026 3.49
a0 (1) 0.448 0.085 5.27
a2 (1) 0.213 0.039 5.44β5 (2) 1.302 0.205 6.37λ (1) –0.01 0.0022 4.80
logγ (1) –1.657 0.756 2.19
logA (2) –14.147 1.147 12.49
Note: All parameters are significantly different from zero around 1 per cent level, have the 
correct signs and assume some quite plausible values except the intercept of equation (2) for 
employment
Table  III.
Estimated elasticities 
and intercepts
The implications of the model  for subsequent phases of economic 
development. Some  simulation experiments
This section, devoted to the model’s capability to interpret various historical 
situations, is an indicator of its degree of generality. It also accounts for the 
succession of some stages of economic development simply by making some 
suitable alternative assumptions on the availability of entrepreneurial skills, 
technology, income distribution, the market forms and, more broadly, the 
performance of dynamic competition,  i.e. the basic engine of evolution.
It may be convenient to postulate an initial phase of development. This will 
probably be distinguished by: weak entrepreneurial skills and aggressiveness 
(especially in the presence of a civilization hostile to entrepreneurs and market 
institution) hence a substantial  absence of dynamic comp etition; low 
productivity, i.e. high labour coefficient; real wages close to the subsistence 
level, hence incompressible downward. Such an economy produces a low 
surplus, which is largely paid to the owners of scarce resources. In 
consequence  and according to equation (7), the profit rate r is low and 
decreasing. Besides,  the lack in entrepreneurial skill will stimulate the 
desired profit rate (r*).
Therefore the rate of growth of output will decrease towards zero, according to
equation (4). This is the only equilibrium possible, as the stagnation stops the 
increase in the rent, hence the decrease in profit, and the increase in r*. This 
situation is illustrated partly by the model in formulation of a simplified version 
in the Appendix, showing that the term Xη–1 with 0 < η < 1 (that postulates a
decreasing availability of entrepreneurial skills per unit of output) implies the 
existence of a stable stationary equilibrium. This “trap of underdevelopment” 
expresses a situation similar to that described by the Ricardian theory of 
g rowth and stagnation, cor related to the absence of the evolutive push 
conferred by dynamic competition.
If the economy succeeds in avoiding the trap, it can start the development of
a dynamic sector. To do that, it requires a primary accumulation in the form of
infrastr uctu re , education, investment in the new secto r, and to 
promote
entrepreneurship, necessary to invest the available resources and increase
productivity through dynamic competition. In this regard, it may be important 
to influence the ethic system, so as to increase τ (non-monetary benefit attached 
to the entrepreneurial function), that may compensate the disincentive to 
produce due to low profit rate. In particular, an entrepreneurial Stakhanovism
may be promoted, as well as state entrepreneurship (which is not necessarily 
influenced by profit rate but only requires the consideration of relative profit 
rates of firms to evaluate the convenience to finance them). In this way, the 
absorption of the resources for accumulation is warranted. Another possibility 
is to build a command economy,  i.e. without entrepreneurs. This short cut can 
initially be successful but, in the long run, it pushes the economy into a blind 
road, as is well known. This model, with a dynamic sector expressing a strong 
dynamic competition, may produce two different evolutions.
First, prices and wages are governed by demand and supply. In this case, if
there does not exist a lack of entrepreneurship, i.e. if this grows linearly with
production (as assumed in formulations for markets regulated by demand and
supply and  oligopolistic markets in the Appendix), a Lewisian process of
growth can take place. The excess of labour present in the backward sector
squeezes wages in the dynamic sector towards the subsistence level. (More
precisely, a low differential of wages with the backward sector is enough to
convey towards the dynamic sector the labour force it needs.) This, together
with a sectoral productivity much higher than that of the backward sector,
implies a high profit rate, that promotes a high accumulation rate. A cyclical
expansion (due to the interaction between innovation and uncertainty) of the
dynamic sector around an increasing trend leads to a gradual absorption of the
excess labour in the backward sector, ending with its disappearance.
Second, the growth in the size of firms and the bargaining power of trade
unions creates an oligopolistic market for goods and labour. In this case real
wages in the dynamic sector go beyond the subsistence level, under the
influence of the increase in labour productivity. This behaviour is promoted
both by the demands by trade unions for productivity increases distribution
and the interest of firms to wage increases that warrant the constancy of unit
labour cost hence, for a given margin of mark up, the downward rigidity of
oligopolistic prices, as well as an increasing demand of sectoral production.
Profits are now much lower than in the first case; consequently, the sectoral 
rate
of growth slows down. Furthermore, the increasing wage differential between
the two sectors provokes an explosive exodus from the backward sector, that
exceeds the labour force needs of the advanced sector. This stimulates the birth
of a refuge sector and an increasing inflationary potential, due to social 
tensions  and bottlenecks in the immigration areas and the proliferation of 
assisted areas. As long as firms have the control of income distribution through 
market power,  these inefficiencies and costs are charged (via inflation) 
on labou r that negotiates money wages, without affecting profit rate. But the 
rate of growth is now lower than in the first case, therefore the disappearance 
of the backward sector requires much more time than in the first case.
Over time, real wages may cease to be a residue, through their indexation or
in the presence of a fixed exchange rate. As a consequence, the costs and
inefficiencies accompanying the excess exodus squeeze profits and cause a
cyclical involution towards stagnation (trap of dualism). (An estimation for
Italy of this phenomenon is in Fusari, 1986.) In this situation the strength of
dynamic competition in the advanced sector may imply, together with the
deepening of dualism, the strengthening of the trap. This may be formalized 
by
postulating a modified system of Lotka-Volterra equations, expressing the
interaction between the rate of growth of labour productivity in the dynamic
secto r, as the prey that   fe eds (through an incre asing difference in 
the
intersectoral standards of life) the excess exodus, and the latter as the predator,
that squeezes the exponential rate of growth of productivity in the dynamic
sector (presumably pushed by an autonomous catching up mechanism). Note
that, differently from the basic Volterra model, where uncertainty fluctuates
around some values tendentially invariant in the long run, i.e. towards a limit
cycle, here the excess exodus tends to cumulate. More precisely, the Volterra
system has to be expressed now in a degenerate form, i.e. without the negative
constant in the equation of the excess exodus (predator). This causes an
uninterrupted growth of the predator and probably the disappearance of the
prey, i.e. the involution of the cycle towards a zero growth 
equilibrium.
Another way to express this involutive process is to specify, in the basic
model: one equation for the excess exodus; one representing the inflationary
effect of this exodus; one equation for re al wages in the dynamic secto r
depending on the sectoral increase in labour productivity; the impossibility for
this sector (due to international competition) to charge the costs caused by the
excess exodus to domestic inflation. So, the rate of profit in the dynamic sector
is squeezed, hence the accumulation process.
To prevent this, income policies, the control of migration and of disequilibria
able to avoid excess exodus are required. We can se e, therefore,  that the
promotion of the take-off needs instr uments that markedly differ with the
lateness of the development process, as pointed out by the famous 
storiographic
research of Gerschenkron (1962).
This kind of involution is very frequent today, especially in Latin America,
South East Asia, and the Middle East; it is mainly expressed by the abnormal
growth of many towns in the third world; it also represents a great menace for
Easter n Europe countries in transition towards market institution, mainly
Poland with its overcrowded agriculture.
Now suppose that both the trap of underdevelopment and dualism are
avoided. Two basic situations can arise:
 
(1) An economy characterized by a well-oiled form of dynamic competition, 
flexible money wages deter mined by excess demand, re al wages 
fluctuating with the marginal productivity of labour. Such an economy 
satisfies the conditions for the achievement of a high and stable rate of 
growth if dynamic competition manages to avoid, through innovation, 
bottlenecks in natural resources and to promote a high increase in 
productivity.
(2)   An economy distinguished by a diffuse market power, hence money 
wage rigidity, its share of income distribution determined by the degree 
of monopoly of firms and therefore with the real wage as a residue. This 
model has been analysed in the Appendix under the formulation with 
market power (and abstracting from dynamic competition mechanism), 
that shows it can yield a stable equilibrium. But the rigidity of money 
wages precludes full employment.
Finally, in a matu re and consumeristic economy, high inflation destroys 
monetary illusion, hence the assumption of real wages as a residue, that has 
be en proved in the simplified fo r mulation in the App endix to be a 
basic condition for the achievement of a long run equilibrium. More precisely, 
wage  bargaining, public sector inefficiencies and expenditure, formal  or 
informal  indexation mechanisms strongly influence, in the end, profit rate, 
hence  the  path of growth. The control of income distribution is usually 
restored by high  unemployment.  This tendency towards stagnation may be 
overcome through  some institutional changes that limit income distribution 
conflict to the political and social sphere, to restore its irrelevance for firms. We 
can see, therefore, that  history and economic theory go hand in hand even at 
the aggregate level.
It may be useful to perform some simulation experiment through a model 
formed by the two groups of equations estimated separately in the previous 
section. Differently from that estimation, now uncertainty is added in the 
equation for output, while innovation and the variation of uncertainty are added 
in the equation for employment.
Four phases of economic development have been considered:
(1) Phase I, representing an initial stage of development, that assumes the 
following values of the parameters of the Volterra system (1-2): β1 =
0.262; β2  =  0.517; β3  =  0.112; β4  =  0.663. These values imply a
languishing dynamic competition. Besides, the parameter of uncertainty
in the equation of output is 0.08 and those of innovation and uncertainty 
in the equation for employment are respectively 0.1 and 3.8. α1 has been 
reduced to 2.14, to express a reduction in entrepreneurial alertness; also 
the   p arameter   indicating   the   impact   of   the   conditions   of
entrepreneurship on output has been reduced from 0.213 estimated to
0.203. The initial number of patent applications is 300 and the initial 
interquartile variation of profit rates is 0.65.
(2) Phase II presumes that a Lewisian mechanism of development is at work.
The parameters of the system of Volterra are now as follows: β1 = 0.38;
β2 = 0.49; β3 = 0.232; β4 = 0.53, expressing a substantial increase , with 
respect to phase I, of the parameters β1 and β3 concerning innovative and 
adaptive push, and a remarkable decrease in β2 and β4 representing the 
brake to innovation and adaptation. The initial number of p atent
applications is now 350 and the initial interquartile variance of profit rate 
is 0.75. The parameter of uncertainty in the equation of output is 0.05 
and those of innovation and uncertainty in the equation for employment 
are 0.14 and 2.8. Moreover, an hyp othesis that re al wage remains 
constant over time is assumed, as in Lewis’ mechanism.
(3)   Phase III presumes that wages grow less than labour productivity. An 
impact of the conditions of entrepreneurship on output higher than the 
previous phases is hypothesized (0.2184 against 0.2134 estimated). The 
parameters of the equations of innovation and uncertainty are now as 
follows: β1 = 0.415; β2 = 0.455; β3 = 0.275; β4 = 0.48, that presume a
further considerable increase in the strength of dynamic competition.
The initial number of patent  applications is 425 and the initial 
interquartile variance of profit rates 0.82.
(4) Phase IV refers to a mature consumeristic economy, distinguished by a 
strong conflict for income distribution, hence by a severe reduction in 
profit rate. All parameters are identical to phase III.
The results of simulations are expressed in Figures 1-6. They are not discussed 
for space reasons, but the different paths, in the various phases, of each one of 
the key variables considered, as well as the different performance of the whole 
economy, are immediately evident.
Conclusion
This essay shows that the explanation of economic growth and development 
requires an accurate deepening of the crucial phenomena of entrepreneurship,
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innovation, uncertainty of economic life and their interrelationships. Such a 
de epening can be centred efficaciously on a particular notion of dynamic 
comp etition that  results  from the  combination of two  main  kinds  of 
entrepreneurship and their interaction, the innovative and the adaptive, and 
made active by the struggle for profit. This competition explains the succession 
disequilibria-equilibria in the economy and the basic feature of the engine of 
development and growth.
2.9
2.7
2.5
2.3
2.1
1.9
1.7
(19)80 81  82  83  84  85  86  87  88  89  90  91  92  93
Year
Key
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4
Figure  4. 
Real labour productivity 
in industry (natural 
logorithms)
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
(19)80 81  82  83  84  85  86  87  88  89  90  91  92  93
Year
Key
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3-4
Figure  5.
Patent applications
All indications today are that in modern society, with its immense 
technological  p otential, the re al limit to economic development is its 
endowment of  entrepreneurship. This influences decisively  both partial 
equilibrium and actual profit rates, hence the pace of activity, investment and 
cycle behaviour.  An application of the model to successive phases of 
historical development  gives a proof of the generality and flexibility of the 
theory proposed and of its explanatory power in regard to economic evolution, 
and shows some different paths of economic development.
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Further more, the model outlines the importance, in the social life, of the 
binomial innovation-str uctu ral  o rganization, i.e. the  disequilibrating- 
equilibrating motion, and shows succinctly that the theory presented can flow 
into a more general theory of social development. This is a major task for 
social  sciences. It is no accident that the “propensity” for development varies 
greatly  between civilizations and historical eras. The presence and 
responsibility of  innovative entre preneu rship imply, as preconditions, 
certain premisses  concerning values and institutions typical of decentralized 
economic orders: the market, profit, openness to innovation and change, to the 
unorthodox and the  non-conformist, the critical sense, individualism  (not 
necessarily the acquisitive self-interest), the competitive spirit, and so on. Adam 
Smith took pains to stress the decisive influence of the size of the market in 
intensifying the division of  labour, and hence in generating the rise in 
productivity. Actually, though, the  imp o rtance of the market for 
development is antecedent even to this. In particular, it stems from the fact 
that the market, together with its related ethic values and behaviour patterns, 
gives the division of labour an evolutionary  character, preventing it from 
becoming the reflection and the seal of more or less rigid social stratification if 
not the actual division of society into castes. But these topics go beyond the 
object of this essay.
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Appendix. Qualitative analysis of the model
The central mechanism of development and growth that the model in this essay points out, that
is the incessant disequilibrating-equilibrating motion resulting from the interaction between
innovative and adaptive entre preneu rship, cle arly implies the imp ossibility of a 
stable
equilibrium at the micro level. It also legitimates some serious doubt on the existence of a stable
equilibrium at the sectoral level.
This appendix investigates the existence of a stable equilibrium solution at the macro level, i.e.
the level to which analyses on the stability of equilibrium usually refer. We shall see that to get 
a
macro stable equilibrium it needs to eliminate from the model the Volterra system for innovation
and uncertainty (giving an aggregate expression of the dynamic competition process). Such a
result indirectly proves the impossibility of a stable equilibrium even at the sectoral level, if the
mechanism of dynamic competition is preserved. This implies that the stability properties of
some economic model must be considered with great caution, as they always depend on the
removal from the model of some crucial part of 
reality.
Now we come to provide some formulation of the model able to get a stable equilibrium
solution.
Markets regulated by demand and supply
First we consider a market regulated by the excess demand, also making the hypothesis that real 
wage is equal to the marginal productivity of labour, that implies the irrelevance for firms of the 
conflict for income distribution. In order to obtain a stable equilibrium, the original model must 
be expressed as follows:
r* = a0 + a1u – a2γ – a3(X
d/X) – a4τ (A1)
u
DX/X
= b1DK/K + b3ξ
= α (r – r*)
(A2)
(A3)
DK/K
r
= a – du + b2(X
d/X)
= X/K – L/K(w/p) – i – tax
(A4)
(A5)
L/K = (X/K)1/β 5K – (β 6 + β5 – 1)/β 5e – (β 7/β 5)DK/Ke(β 8/β 5)u (A6)
Dp/p = µ (Xd/X) (A7)
Xd/X = C/X + DK/K(K/X) + Z/X (A8)
C = cX (A9)
w/p = ϑX/ϑL. (A10)
Endogenous
r* = partial equilibrium or desired real profit rate;
u = uncertainty per unit of output;
X = output;
K = stock of capital; 
r = real profit rate; 
L = employment;
p = price;
Xd = real aggregate demand; 
C = real consumption;
w/p = real wage;
Ep = availability of entrepreneurial skills, replaced in equation (A1) by γ (see below). 
Exogenous
τ = non-monetary benefits attached to entrepreneurial role;
ξ = exogenous factor of uncertainty;
i = real interest rate;
tax = taxation per unit of capital;
Z = exogenous final demand;
D = differential operator d/dt, ϑ indicates partial derivative.
Ep in equation (A1) has been expressed as a linear function of X, i.e. Ep = γ X, and divided by the 
scale factor X. Later this expression will be substituted by Ep = Xη and the implications of this 
more realistic formulation discussed.
Another important assumption is represented by equation (A10), stating the equality between 
real wage and marginal productivity of labour (w/p = ϑ X/ϑ L). Such an hypothesis on real wages 
yields a decisive simplification for the model reduction, as it permits to eliminate equation (A6) 
and p in identity (A5). Later the assumption expressed by equation (A10) will be released, in 
relation to the hypothesis of oligopolistic market, and it will be shown that such new formulation 
does not affect the stability of equilibrium.
Equation (A6) has been divided through by K; so it expresses the labour – capital ratio, and 
equation (A8) has been divided through by X. This facilitates the reduction of the model without 
modifying its content. The share of the endogenous demand (Z/X) has been considered as 
exogenous and indicated with z. Equation (A7) implies that price variations cannot be negative or 
zero; but this equation is irrelevant for the model reduction, as Dp/p does not appear in any other 
equation while p in identity (A5) is eliminated as above.
A zero order equation for uncertainty (equation A2) has been substituted to the corresponding 
differential equation in the original model. This implies a substantial dynamic irrelevance of 
uncertainty, that in fact will be eliminated by substitution. Also the differential equation for 
innovation has been excluded from the model. The consequent elimination of the Volterra 
system  permits the reduction of  the model to one differential equation, that g reatly 
simplifies the  qualitative analysis. This elimination is essential to achieve the stable 
equilibrium solution  discussed below and represents a drastic modification  of the original 
model, as it cancels out the crucial dynamic mechanism of an entrepreneurial economy.
The elimination of the Volterra system, hence of the cycle of uncertainty, implies in the 
original equation for capital a prior assumption that DK/K ≠ DX/X and therefore that a stable 
solution requires DX = 0 and DK = 0. To avoid this implication, the equation for capital has 
been reformulated as in equation (A4).
The reduction of this new model may start from the substitution of equations (A6) and (A10)
into equation (A5). Multiply L/L to the expression of marginal productivity of labour, hence 
substitute to L its expression. So we get ϑX/ϑL = β5(X/L), implying ϑX/ϑL(L/K) = β5X/L(L/K) = β 5X/K. As ϑX/ϑL = w/p, it follows: L/K(w/p) = β 5X/K. Substitute this in identity equation (A5), 
obtaining:
r = (1 – β5)X/K – i – tax. (A5a)
1 2
1 2
A
A
2
Now substitute equation (A9) into equation (A8). Also equation (A2) can be substituted in 
equations (A1) and (A4), and equation (A8) into equations (A1) and (A7). After elimination of all 
irrelevant variables, we get a system of two differential equations in X and K that, considering 
the:
X X  DX X  DK 
D –
K K   X K   K
can be reduced to one differential equation in the output – capital ratio, as follows:
X
X X X 
D a a
[( a
2 – 1 ) K
a ]( a   b  c    b  z – db    )
3 2 2 3
K K 0 1 K
(1    db
X
) – b
with:
1   K 2
a′1 = α(1 – β 5); a′2 = – α a1b1; a′3 = α a3; a′0 = α ( – i – tax – a0 + a2γ + a3c + a3z + a4τ – db3ξ );
z = Z/X.
This equation has a particular solution X/K = 0 (trivial solution) and one obtainable by equating 
to zero the expression multiplying the first X/K in the right-hand side, provided that X/K ≠ b2/(1
+ db1). It is a second degree equation, i.e.:
C0x
2 + C1x + C2 = 0 with x = X/K and:
C0 = α (1 – β 5)(1 + db1)
C1 = + a′ 0(1 + db1) – α (1 – β 5)b2 + ( – α a1b1 – 1)(a + b2c + b2z – db3ξ)
C2 = – a′ 0b2 + α a3(a + b2c + b2z – db3ξ ). 
Dividing C1 and C2 by C0 gets:
a0 (1
1
db1 ) –   (1 – 5 )b2  – 1    2
(1 – 5 )(1 db1 )
– a0b2
2
(1 – 5 )(1
a3   2
db1 )
where: µ1 = 1 + α a1b1 and µ2 = a + b2c + b2z – 
db3ξ.
A1 < 0 as all terms in the numerator are non-negative, while the denominator is positive; true
to tell, the first term in the numerator could be positive, but it is certainly lower than the negative
sum of the other two since a0′ (1 + db1) tends to be lower than µ 1µ 2, especially if α < 1,  as it 
stands out if we consider the parameters involved and take into account the inequality below, 
to be satisfied to get a real solution.
A1 < 0 implies the positivity (i.e. the economic relevance) of at least one solution and, if A2 <
0, that the solutions are real. But it is very probable that A2 is positive. This means that, to verify
if the solutions are real, it is necessary to analyse the following expression:
2
A 2 – 4 A [ a0 (1 db1 ) –   (1 – 5 )b2  – 1    2 ]   – 4 (1 –
2
5 )(1 db1 )(– a0b2 a3   2 ) .
[   (1 – 5 )(1 db1 )]
Develop the square term in the numerator, collect terms, add and subtract 2α µ 1µ 2(1 – β5)b2, 
getting:
A 2 – 4 A
[ a0 (1 db1 ) –   (1 – 5 )b2  – 1    2 ] 4 2 (1 –
2
5 )[ 1b2  – a3 (1 db1 )] .
[   (1 – 5 )(1 db1 )]
1Of course,the non-negativity of the above expression (implying real solutions) depends on [µ1b2
– α a3(1 + db1)]. This must be non-negative or, if negative, must not exceed in absolute value the 
square term in the numerator. Take the condition [µ 1b2 – α a3(1 + db1)] ≥ 0, i.e. substituting to µ1 
its expression, b2/a3 ≥ α(1 + db1)/(1 + α a1b1). d > a1, the influence of uncertainty on investment 
being higher than on production. Therefore, if α = 1, the right hand side term of the above
inequality is higher than one; so, a real solution is warranted if the parameter b2 of demand in the 
equation of investment exceeds the parameter a3 of demand in the equation of output at least of 
the amount (1 + db1)/(1 + a1b1). Values of α higher than unity reinforce the necessity of such 
prevalence, while α < 1 tends to reverse it. But real solutions may exist even if [µ 1b2 – α a3(1 + 
db1)]  is negative, provided that the square term in the numerator be at least equal to it. 
Unfortunately,  this is unlikely to happen, as some factors (α ,  µ 2, β 5) on which the positivity of 
the above square
term depends also are coefficients (multiplied by four) of the negative value of [µ 1b2 – αa3(1+ db1)].
Being √A12 – 4A2 lower than the absolute value of A1 and A1 < 0, we get the two 
following positive (real) solutions:
X*/K* = (–A1 + g)/2 and (–A1 –g)/2, with g =√A2 – 4A2.
The substitution of these two equilibrium values in the reduced form equations of output and 
capital gets the equilibrium rate of growth of these two variables.
Now consider if this equilibrium is stable. Take:
Dx = C0x
2 + C1x + C2
with
x = X/K.
To the equilibrium value x* it corresponds:
C0x
*
2 + C1x
* + C2 = 0.
The deviation from the equilibrium may be expressed as:
D(x – x*) = C0(x – x
*)2 – C0x
*2 + (2C0x
* + C1)x + C2
that, after some transformations, becomes:
D(x – x*) = C0(x – x
*)2 + (2C0x
* + C1)(x – x
*).
Therefore, the stability condition is (2C0x
* + C1) < 0 or, dividing by C0, (2x
* + A1) < 0. Another 
way to obtain the stability condition is the following: Define x = X/Kx*(= elogX – logK – logx*), with 
x* = X/K. Therefore: x*Dx = x*2x2 + A1x
*x + A2 is In x = 1 equilibrium. Linearize the above
expression, getting: Dx = 2x* x + A1 x + 1/x
* [R(x)], where R is the remainder of the Taylor
expansion. The stability condition is 2x* + A1 < 0. Substitute in this stability condition the value 
of x*, i.e. (–A1 + g)/2 and (–A1 – g)/2, we get: 2x
* + A1 = ± g. Therefore,  we have a stable solution 
in correspondence of – g (provided that g > 0), to which it corresponds the lower equilibrium
output-capital ratio.
It must be useful to explore the possibility to push the equilibrium growth rate of output and
capital using some parameters as instruments. Of course, this would need the substitution of 
X*/K* in the reduced expressions of those variables. But that gives some very intricate formulae. 
Alternatively, some parallel variations of parameters in the non-equilibrium reduced expressions 
of DX/X and DK/K can be considered, making the hypothesis that the effects on X*/K* of such 
parallel variations tend to compensate. This shows that the steady-state trajectory can be pushed 
through p arallel reductions in p arameters a1 and d, i.e. by stimulating entre preneu rial
aggressivity, as  well as  through some contemporary increases in a3 and b2, concerning the 
impact
of demand on output and capital. Also appropriate variations of the parameters giving the term
µ 2, and the instr umental parameters present in the expression of a′ 0, stimulate equilibrium 
growth. Particularly important, in this regard, is the role of γ and τ , i.e. of policies aimed at 
increasing the availability of entrepreneurial skills (Ep), or of ethic-ideologic motivations pushing
entrepreneurial stakanovism. In conclusion, equilibrium growth of both output and capital may 
be stimulated through high values of a3, b2, a, c, z and a'0, and low values of ξ , d, a1.
If the availability of labour (Ls) is included in the model, together with the assumption that real 
wages depend on demand and supply of labour with its self-correcting tendency towards full 
employment, the equilibrium converges towards a rate of growth resulting from the sum of the 
variation rates of average labour productivity and of the availability of labour, Dlog(X/L) + 
DlogLs, i.e. the so called “natural rate of growth”, where the labour productivity results from the 
factors influencing X and L, that largely differ from those determining growth through the 
production function in the traditional theory.
Oligopolistic markets
In this case equation (A10) is eliminated and equation (A7) is substituted by the following:
p = (1 + pi)wϑL/ϑX
implying that the real wage is a residue, as the share of labour on income is determined by the 
price leader, while money wage is considered exogenous.  So, the irrelevance for firms of income 
distribution conflict holds. Take equation (A6) of the original model, i.e.:
L = X1/β5K–(β6 + β5 – 1)/β 5e – (β 7/β 5)DK/Keβ 8/β 5u.
Multiply and divide by L/X its derivative with respect to X, getting:
ϑL/ϑX = 1/β5L/X.
Substitute the above expression in that of oligopolistic price and the resulting equation in identity 
equation (A5). This gets:
r = [1 – β 5/(1 + pi)]X/K – i – tax (A5a)
β 5/(1 + pi ) replaces β5 in equation (A5b) in the previous Appendix section “Markets regulated by 
demand and supply”. Therefore, the stable equilibrium achieved there still holds. But there exists 
an important difference with respect to the case concerning markets regulated by demand and
supply. The assumption that money wages are now exogenous, as in the Keynesian approach, 
means that the equilibrium rate of growth may imply unemployment, i.e. it does not converge 
towards the “natural” rate of growth (DlogX/L + DlogLs).
A simplified version of the model including a non-linear function for the availability of  
entrepreneurship
Now introduce the non-linear term Xη for the availability of entrepreneurial skill in the equation 
for output and the assumption that investment is proportional to output, implying the substitu- 
tion of the equation for the stock of capital by K = vX; v is the capital output ratio. Besides, a 
prod- uction function with constant coefficient (L = lX, with l representing the labour coefficient) 
and a markup relation fo r price are used. This simplified model is appropriate to clarify 
some implication of the relation Ep = Xη .
Substituting K with vX, we get the expression for the profit rate: r = pi /v(1 + i) – i – tax.
The reduced form of the model is:
DX/X = α [pi /v(1 + pi ) – i – tax + a2X
η–1 + a3(c + vDX/X + z) –a0 + a1ξχi+ a4τ ] (A11)
that, putting a'0 = pi /v(1 + pi ) – i – tax – a0 + a1ξ + a3(c + z) + a4τ , becomes:
DX/X = a'0/(1 – a3v) + a2X
η –1/(1 – a3v). (A11a)
Put a'0/(1 – a3v) = a; a2/(1 – a3v) = b and 
η –1 = H, hence equation (A11a) takes the form DlogX = 
a + be HlogX. Equating this expression to zero and dividing by b, yields: HlogX = log(–a/b). We can 
see that the existence of a stationary equilibrium (X* = (–a/b)1/H) requires that a and b have
opposite signs, so that log(–a/b) is positive. a2 (in the expression of b) and 1 – a3v being positive, 
the existence of the equilibrium requires that a′0 < 0.
As is well known, the stability analysis starts from the deviation from equilibrium y = logX
– logX*. The constancy of X* implies that Dy = DlogX. Now express the model in terms of 
deviations from the equilibrium:
Dy = a + [beH(logX – logX*)]eHlogX*
X* being equal to (1/H)log(– a/b), Dy = a + beHyelog(–a/b). Therefore
Dy = a – aeHy , i.e. Dy = a – a – aHy – aH2y2/2!…
This expression tends to zero, i.e. the equilibrium is stable, if a and H have the same sign. As 
previously seen, the existence of equilibrium requires a′0 < 0 hence a < 0; it follows that the 
condition for stability is η < 1 so that H < 0, i.e.  the availability of entrepreneurial skill must 
vary less than output.
If we put η = 1, the expression (A11a) of DX/X becomes constant. This equilibrium expressed 
by a constant is unstable, but it is possible to achieve it through variations of some control 
parameters.
The existence of a stable equilibrium solution can be proved immediately in the following 
oversimplified model:
DX = α(Xd – X)                                                                                                                              (A12) 
P = (1 + pi)lw                                                                                                          (A13) 
C = c(Lw)/P                                                                                                                             (A14) 
Xd = C + G                                                                                                             (A15) 
L = lX.                                                                                                                   (A16)
Where G indicates public expenditure and c is the propension to consume.
The reduced form is:
DX = α  [cX/(1 + pi ) + G – X].                                                                                                        (A12a) 
Therefore, the equilibrium solution is: X* = G[(1 + pi )/(1 + pi – c)]. The coefficient of G is the
Keynesian multiplier. Now rewrite the equation for DX as follows: DX = α [( – 1 + c – pi )/(1 + 
pi)]X
+ α G. The negativity of the coefficient of X proves that the solution implies a stable equilibrium.
The complete model
The model developed in this paper, that is including the Lotka-Volterra equations and the term Xη (for 
the availability of entrepreneurial skills) in the equation of supply does not collapse to one equation. If 
we  preserve  the  hypotheses  that  real  wage  is  equal  to  marginal  productivity  of  labour or,  in  the 
presence of oligopolistic markets, is a residual, and assume that the variance of profit rates across firms 
coincides with uncertainty, the reduced form of the model is as follows:
DI I
= b 1 – b2u (A17)
I
 I
Du = – b 3 + b 4 I I  + c1x (A18)
u
DX = a [(1 – b 5 ) X – i – tax – a1 u + a2 X η  – 1  + a3 DK K – a0  + a3 ( c + z ) + a4t ]     A19)
X K K  X
DK = b DX – a5u. (A20)
K a X
In the hypothesis of oligopolistic markets,  β5 in equation (A19) above is replaced by  β5/(1 +  π). This 
model describes a cycle depending on the values of the parameters β1, β2, β3, β4. Only for
some particular and quite improbable values of those parameters do we get a limit cycle.
